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Recent Decisions
USE-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-42 U.S.C. § 1983-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held
that a complaint which alleged that a building permit was arbitrarily and capriciously withheld stated a substantive due process
claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
LAND

Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596(8th Cir. 1986)
In August of 1983, James W. Littlefield and Bonnie J. Littlefield
purchased a 19.3 acre tract of land located in Afton, Minnesota.' It
was the Littlefields' intention to construct a single-family residence on this tract of land.2 The Littlefields were notified on September 9, 1983, by Helen Baker, the zoning administrator for the
City of Afton, that they could not receive a building permit for the
construction of their proposed residence because their purchase
represented a subdivision of their seller's land which was not approved by the City.'
After public meetings by the Afton Zoning Administration Committee (AZAC) and the City Council during September and October of 1983, the City Council adopted a recommendation by AZAC
that the subdivision of the Littlefields' grantor's property be approved subject to compliance with certain conditions.4 The major
condition placed upon this approval, and the key factual situation
surrounding this litigation, was that the Littlefields convey a right
of way to the owners of a neighboring parcel of property. The purpose of the conveyance was to provide access for the neighboring
parcel, which the City determined would be land-locked and inaccessible to a County road because of the Littlefields'proposed
construction."
The neighboring parcel of land for which the City desired to pro1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 598 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 599.
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vide access was owned by Helen Baker, Afton's Zoning Administrator, her husband and Robert Fritz and his wife.' By a letter dated
July 10, 1984, the City advised the Littlefields that "the City now
stands willing and ready to grant you a building permit once you
have conveyed to Mr. and Mrs. Baker and Mr. and Mrs. Fritz the
'7
additional public right of way.
The Littlefields instituted an action in the District Court for the
District of Minnesota in November of 1983, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 ("§ 1983"),' seeking injunctive relief and damages.' In their
complaint, the Littlefields alleged that the City of Afton had violated their procedural and substantive due process rights, thereby
effectuating a taking of property without just compensation.1 0 The
Littlefields' "taking" argument revolved around the theory that
the City of Afton's action was not within the scope of its eminent
domain powers since the City intended to use the land in question
for private purposes and not for any legitimate public purpose."
The District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Afton and the other named
defendants in the case. 2 The district court stated that the Littlefields did not have a constitutionally protected property interest
in the issuance of a building permit.13 The matter was seen strictly
as a local issue which was covered by state law, and therefore reviewable only by a state court. Accordingly, the taking claim asserted by the appellants was reviewable at the state-court level because of the existence of state remedies, such as inverse
condemnation or a writ of mandamus. 4
Before the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Littlefields argued that an appeal should be granted because the dis6. Id. at 598. The Fritz/Baker property never had access to the county road. Id.
7. Id. at 598-99.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ...,subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
. . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity
or other proper proceeding for redress.
9. 785 F.2d at 599.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Littlefield v. City of Afton, No. 4-83-1003 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 1983). The other
parties named as defendants by the Littlefields' complaint were the members of Afton's
City Council and Helen Baker (the City's Zoning Administrator).
13. Id., slip op. at 4.
14. Id., slip op. at 7.
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trict court erred (1) in holding that they had no property interest
in the building permit, and (2) in holding that they could not institute a § 1983 claim in a federal court if state remedies existed. 15
The Littlefields' major argument was that the City violated the
Littlefields' substantive due process rights by arbitrarily withholding the building permit.16
The City, on appeal, renewed its argument which was successful
before the district court, relying upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Parrattv. Taylor.1 7 The City argued that Parratt prohibited the maintaining of a due process claim where a
state remedy existed.18
In reaching a decision in this case, the Eighth Circuit first held
that the Littlefields' procedural due process rights were not violated, in that the appellants had opportunities to attend public
hearings on their grantor's subdivision application. The court concluded that the Littlefields did in fact attend these hearings, which
was sufficient to satisfy any predeprivation hearing requirement. 9
However, the Eighth Circuit, in this case of first impression, held
that the Littlefields' action did state a substantive due process
claim.' 0 The court opined that the district court should not have
granted a summary judgment.21 In light of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, the case was remanded for a jury determination as to
whether the City's actions, in conditioning the issuance of a building permit upon the Littlefields' making a conveyance to a third
party, were arbitrary and capricious."
In concluding that the Littlefields' procedural due process rights
were not violated, the Eight Circuit announced a three tier analysis
which courts should follow to determine whether such a violation
15. 785 F.2d at 598.
16. Id. In addition to their contentions of a substantive due process violation, the Littlefields advanced two specific arguments regarding their claimed property interest in the
building permit. First, they asserted that the issuance of a building permit is not discretionary under Minnesota law and that the permit must be granted if an applicant meets the
requirements for the permit. Next, the Littlefields contended that they met all pertinent
requirements of Afton ordinances which control land use and building permits. Id.
17. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
18. 785 F.2d at 599.
19. Id. at 603. In reaching the conclusion that no procedural due process violation
occurred, the Eighth Circuit decided that the Littleflelds did have a protected property interest. As will be discussed, this protected interest was derived from the Littlefields' compliance with certain provisions of the Afton City Code.
20. 785 F.2d at 607.
21. Id. at 599.
22. Id. at 610.
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occurred. 3 Initially, a court must ascertain whether a plaintiff has
a constitutionally protected property right in the land use permit
being sought or in the claim being asserted. " Next, if such a property right does exist, a court determines whether a plaintiff has a
right to a predeprivation hearing for the violation of the protected
property right.2 5 At this second tier, it is also necessary to consider
what type of predeprivation hearing is needed to protect the plaintiff's right.2 6 Finally, where a court determines that a predeprivation hearing is not required, it must determine what type of postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to protect the plaintiff's property
right.2 7
The Eighth Circuit held that the Littlefields did have a constitutionally protected property interest in the building permit which
the City was denying them. 8 The court concluded that a property
interest may be created by legislative or procedural requirements
which are intended to limit the discretion a municipal official has
over the manner by which permits or licenses are issued.2 9 Where a
statute allows a municipality to issue a permit or license "at will,"
no protected property interest exists. Where, however, a municipality's discretion is limited because an applicant meets all statutory requirements, such an applicant may claim a property right.3 0
Minnesota is one such state where an official's discretion is limited when an applicant meets all necessary conditions which are
stipulated in the enabling legislation.3 ' When all such conditions
are met, a permit can be withheld only when there is a showing by
the official that the public health, safety or welfare is threatened.' 2
23. Id. at 600.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 599.
29. Id. at 600.
30. Id. at 600-01. In its discussion of this topic the court cited Medina v. Rudman, 545
F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646
(9th Cir. 1983); and Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983). Therein, the
respective circuit courts, in deciding claims instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, recognized
the notion that an application for a permit which complies with minimum statutory requirements diminishes the municipality's discretion to deny the permit. The property interest
created by such a statutory provision is one which receives due process protection. 785 F.2d
at 600-01.
31. Id.
32. Id. To support this finding the Eighth Circuit cited several Minnesota cases, the
most prominent of which are: Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 221,
125 N.W.2d 846 (1964) (refusal by city to issue permit for construction of sign held to be
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As applied to this case, the Eighth Circuit determined that the
Littlefields met all requirements of the then-applicable Afton City
Code. 33 Having done so, the Littlefields right to the building permit reached the level of a protected property right with all inherent due process deference accompanying it.
Once the Eighth Circuit decided that a protected property right
existed, it turned its attention to the question of whether the City
needed to hold a hearing before it denied the Littlefields the building permit.3 4 The court followed the rationale of Fuentes v.
Shevin3" in stating the proposition that some type of hearing is
required when a party's rights are infringed.3 6 A predeprivation
hearing is required when the action of a municipal official was not
random or unauthorized, and when no pressing government interest existed to justify the postponement of a hearing until after the
deprivation occurred. 7 Based on this rationale, the Eighth Circuit
held that the appellants were entitled to a predeprivation
38
hearing.
The Littlefields were afforded opportunities to be heard on the
matter prior to the City's decision to withhold the permit.39 As was
noted earlier,'0 the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Littlefields
arbitrary); Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969) (applicant who
meets pertinent application provisions cannot be denied special-use permit without showing
by City Council that proposed construction endangers public health, safety and general welfare); and Metro 500 v. City of Brooklyn Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 N.W.2d 358 (1973) (city's
decision that too many service stations existed in area was not sufficiently related to public
health, safety or general welfare to justify denial of special-use permit).
33. The statutory requirements pertinent to the appellants' case are somewhat vague.
Nowhere in the facts does it appear that the appellants actually applied for a building permit to construct their residence. It appears that the denial of the permit was initiated solely
by the City. Ultimately the court determined that the appellants complied with § 909.03 of
the Afton City Code which requires that a copy of a survey must accompany a recorded
deed for the conveyance of a parcel of land between 5 and 20 acres in size. 785 F.2d at 603. §
909.03 does not require platting (the filing of an approved subdivision plan with the City).
Id.
§ 909.02 of the City Code does require a platting for parcels of land under five acres. The
court of appeals stated that the appellants' 19.3 acre parcel did not have to meet any platting requirements. Therefore the appellants complied with § 909.03 of the City Code when
they filed a copy of a survey with their deed. Id.
34. Id. at 603.
35. 407 U.S. 67 (1971). The Fuentes Court held that before a party is deprived of
property, due process of law requires that the party receive notice of the deprivation and an
opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 80.
36. 785 F.2d at 603. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 19.
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were aware of and did attend the public hearings conducted by the
Afton City Council on the issue of their grantor's subdivision. 4
Hence, such opportunities were adequate to protect the appellants'
procedural due process rights."2
It was in the realm of substantive due process that the Eighth
Circuit held that the Littlefields stated a valid claim so as to make
the district court's granting of a summary judgment in favor of the
City an error.43 In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit joined a majority
of circuit courts which have held that a claim may rightfully be
initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a building permit or
land use permit is withheld arbitrarily.4 4 The court did not decide
here whether the City's action was in fact arbitrary,"5 as that question was left open for determination on remand.
Although the court decided that the subject matter of the present dispute may rightfully be heard by federal courts in the
Eighth Circuit, the court's opinion addressed the concern that federal courts should not be seen as "super" zoning boards of appeals. 7 The opinion revealed that more often than not these types
of disputes are primarily local concerns and should be confined to
state courts. " However, there may be circumstances which justify
federal jurisdiction over the matter.49
The standard of review advanced in the Littlefield decision is
that a § 1983 claim for denial of a land use permit should be considered only when a municipal action significantly invades the con41. 785 F.2d at 603.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 607-08.
44. See Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980); Scott v. Greenville
County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruit, 491 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974); Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.
1983); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Southern Coop. Dev. Fund v. Driggers,
696 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983). The basic tenet of these
cases is that a valid federal action is stated when a complaint avers that a permit has been
withheld arbitrarily or capriciously by a local official. But see infra note 116.
45. 785 F.2d at 607.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not explicitly state those circumstances which justify a
substantive due process claim pursuant to § 1983. However, from the court's discussion and
from the other circuits cited, it may be inferred that such circumstances arise when a municipal official's actions in denying the permit are unrelated to the public health, safety and
welfare of the community. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Cf. note 32 and accompanying text.
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stitutional right of an applicant/property owner. 50 The proposition
behind this standard of review is that a municipal official acts arbitrarily and capriciously when the acts have no substantial relationship to the general welfare of the municipality.51
The Eighth Circuit dismissed the Littlefields' taking claim as
not being ripe for consideration by a federal court because of the
existence of state remedies.52 Following the recent Supreme Court
case of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank, 53 the Eighth Circuit held that the Littlefields'
taking claim was premature because they had not pursued a state
remedy for damages via an inverse condemnation claim.5" The
court concluded that the Minnesota decision of McShane v. City of
Faribault55 did not bar the bringing of an inverse condemnation
action. 6 Rather, according to the Eighth Circuit, McShane stands
for the proposition that inverse condemnation actions may be
brought where injunctive relief will not restore a party to its original status.5 7 In addition, the Littlefield court held the appellants'
taking claim was premature in that a constitutional aberration
does not occur until a municipality refuses to fairly compensate a
property owner via statutory procedures.5 8
The origins of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be traced back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871."9 The initial purpose of § 1 of the Civil Rights
50. Id. The court borrows the standard from Sternaman v. County of McHenry, 454 F.
Supp. 240, 242 (N.D, Ill. 1978) and from South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruit, 491 F.2d 5 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974).
51. 785 F.2d at 607 (citing South Gwinnett Venture, 491 F.2d at 7). The court also
uses a quotation from Supreme Court Justice Stevens, initially stated in a separate opinion
in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 547 n.4, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3208 n.4 (1984), wherein Justice
Stevens wrote that actions by municipal officials violate substantive due process rights when
the actions are of a nature which such officials "may not take no matter what procedural
protections accompany them." Id. 785 F.2d at 607.
52. 785 F.2d at 609.
53. U.S. -,
105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). In Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission the Court held that a party may not assert a taking claim unless the party has
received a final administrative decision from the governing body or unless the party has
sought and been denied compensation through available state procedures. Id.
54. 785 F.2d at 609. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
55. 292 N.W. 2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
56. 785 F.2d at 609.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Also often referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat.
13 (1871) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979)). The 1979 amendment had the
purpose of making the provisions of § 1 of the Act applicable to the District of Columbia. 93
Stat. 1284. Aside from the addition of language making the provisions applicable to the
District of Columbia, § 1983 is an exact reenactment of § 1 of the Act of 1871.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:155

Act (now the amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983) was to create a civil remedy in federal court for breach of fourteenth amendment rights
where a state law was either inadequate or was practically unavailable due to improper enforcement by state officials.6 0 Historically,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been viewed by the United States Supreme
Court as a remedial act which should be construed broadly in order to protect the liberty and rights of all citizens from undue deprivation of constitutional rights at the hands of government officials' action under color of the state law. el
As one might expect, a remedy which is construed broadly is
likely to bring within its purview many plaintiffs attempting to
protect diverse rights. 2 But there are those, including the Eighth
Circuit, who express the concern that not every land use and building permit dispute belongs in the federal court system. 3 Notwithstanding that concern, the evolution of the § 1983 remedy to its
present state, whereby the majority of the circuit courts have held
that a claim alleging the undue denial of a land use permit may
state a valid cause of action, can be traced back to two landmark
Supreme Court decisions, Monroe v. Pape6 4 and Monell v. New
York City Department of Social Services.6
The first of these decisions, Monroe v. Pape,66 involved a § 1983
claim brought by a family against the City of Chicago and a group
of its police officers. The petitioners' claim averred that the actions
of the City's police officers, in entering and ransacking the petitioners' home in the middle of the night, was a violation of the
60. The pertinent part of the fourteenth amendment which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeks to
enforce is as follows:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
61. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-82 (1961), wherein the court quotes much
of the congressional debate which took place when the Act of 1871 was being considered.
The Monroe Court also states that an additional purpose of the Act was to supercede certain state laws. Id. at 173.
62. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 683-86 (1978).
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act has been used very widely to protect and preserve the
rights of such sundry groups as freed slaves, prisoners and voters. See generally 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983.
63. 785 F.2d at 607. For cases in accord with the Littlefield case on this concern, see
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901
(1974); Creative Env'ts. Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 989 (1982).
64. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
65. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
66. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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fourth amendment right against unlawful search and seizure assured to them under the fourteenth amendment.6 7
Although Monroe is factually distinguishable from the principal
case in that it does not involve the deprivation of a building permit, it is significant to this discussion because Monroe was the first
case in which the Supreme Court held that a federal claim may be
brought pursuant to § 1983 even though a state statute might offer
a plaintiff relief.68 In arriving at this holding, the Monroe Court
paid considerable attention to the legislative history and congressional discussion behind the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. 9
From these discussions, the Court reasoned that it was irrelevant
that a state law existed which could rightfully address a plaintiff's
cause of action. 70 The federal claim arising from § 1983 was viewed
as supplementing any existing state remedy. 7 1 Furthermore, the
Monroe Court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
first seek the state remedy before petitioning the federal courts for
redress."
The rationale used by the Monroe Court was clearly derived
from the national political climate which existed in 1871 when the
original Civil Rights Act was enacted. Following the Civil War and
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, there were reports of widespread lawlessness in the
South caused primarily by the Ku Klux Klan, and of the inability
of the states to deal with such lawlessness.7 3 The Court found that
there was no doubt that state laws did exist to provide a remedy to
wronged citizens.7 4 However, the problem that existed was that
state officials were either unable or unwilling to enforce a state law
on the books at that time.7 5 The Monroe Court reasoned that § 1
of the Civil Rights Act was enacted by Congress to provide a federal remedy because state laws might not be enforced, thereby denying state citizens the rights and liberties provided them under
76
the fourteenth amendment.
The link between this history and the facts of Monroe is that the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

167.
169-70.
183. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
172-91.
183.

at
at
at
at

174.
174-75.
174-76.
180.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:155

petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure was a federal
constitutional right which could not adequately be protected by
state laws or state courts, which have the natural effect of addressing a state's interests and concerns." Therefore, the protection of
federal rights could only be fully guaranteed in federal courts. The
primary holding of the Monroe Court was that insofar as the complaint alleged that a protected federal right was hindered or
harmed by actions of an official acting under the color of state law,
the complaint stated a valid cause of action under § 1983.78
Similarities exist between the history discussed in Monroe and
the principal case, as state courts cannot be expected to address
and protect the federal due process claims raised in cases such as
Littlefield. State courts, by their very nature, concern themselves
with local issues and disputes. If a complaint properly alleges a
violation of a federally protected right, it belongs in federal court
pursuant to § 1983, according to cases such as Monroe7 and
Littlefield.8 0
While the Monroe Court held that the petitioners in that case
stated a valid cause of action, inasmuch as their constitutional
right against unlawful search and seizure was violated, the Court
stopped short of imposing liability upon the City of Chicago. 1 Instead, the Court held that the petitioners complaint was valid as to
the individual police officers who were acting in their individual
capacities .82 In so holding, the Monroe Court decided that it was
not Congress' intent to bring cities or municipal corporations
within the purview of "persons" as contained in § 1983.83 Based on
its interpretation of the legislative debate8 surrounding the enact77. Id.
78. Id. In arriving at this holding, the Supreme Court reviewed its decisions in which
it defined the construction of the term "under color of law." See United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941) (acts of an election official who altered and falsely counted ballots were
acts under color of state law); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (police officer who
beat to death a suspect during course of arrest acted under color of law); United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951) (private investigator who beat suspect to obtain confessions did
not act under color of law). The Monroe Court stated that an action under the color of state
law is the "[m]isuse of power. . . made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law ..
" 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, supra, at
326.) An action under the color of law was not confined merely to actions taken by an official pursuant to a specific state law. 365 U.S. at 184.
79. Id. at 187.

80.

785 F.2d at 607.

81.
82.
83.
84.

365 U.S. at 187, 191-92.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 190 (citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 820-21).
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ment of the original Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Monroe Court
reasoned that Congress doubted its constitutional abilities to impose civil liability upon municipalities. 5
This distinction between immunity of municipalities and liability of municipal officials acting in individual capacities became especially troublesome to circuit courts when, in an effort to circumvent the municipal immunity imposed by Monroe, § 1983 claims
were instituted against municipal officials as individuals in a veiled
attempt to secure damages or equitable relief not obtainable from
municipalities."
The second aforementioned landmark United States Supreme
Court case would have the effect of doing away with municipal immunity afforded by Monroe, and also of extending the expansive
sweep given to § 1983 claims by Monroe. In 1978, the Supreme
Court decided the case of Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services,"7 in which it overruled that portion of Monroe
which granted local governments absolute immunity from § 1983
claims.8 8 The holding of Monell would ultimately expand the use
of § 1983 to the extent that actions comparable to those of the
Littlefields would become more prevalent.
Monell involved a claim brought by female employees of the respondent Department and the New York City Board of Education
seeking injunctive relief and back pay.89 The petitioners' complaint
alleged that it was the official policy of the Department and the
Board to compel pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence prior to any medical need for such leaves."' While the District Court for the Southern District of New York had concluded
85.

Id. at 187.

86. See S. NAHMOD, CnviL RIGIHTs & Civi

LIBERTms LITIGATION,

A GUIDE To § 1983, §

6.04 (1979 ed.). This type of situation was easily distinguishable where the claim against the
municipal official would lead to a payment of damages from municipal coffers. Courts were
quick to dismiss such claims using Monroe type immunity rationale. However, claims
against municipal officials which sought equitable relief were more troublesome. Most often
circuit courts granted equitable relief despite the economic impact felt by a municipality.
See generally Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield County School Dist., 521 F.2d 1201
(4th Cir. 1975) (grant of equitable relief which included back pay and contributions to retirement fund); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974)
(circuit court awarded equitable relief despite its economic effect on local government
funds).
87. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
88. Id. at 701.
89. Id. at 660. The petitioners' action also named the City of New York, its mayor,
and certain individual defendants who were sued in their official capacities. Id. at 661.
90. Id. at 660-61.
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that the respondents' actions were unconstitutional, 1 it granted
summary judgment for respondents on the theory that the Board,
Department and City enjoyed immunity under Monroe.9 The district court further held that any award of damages on the basis of
the individual officials' liability would ultimately be paid by the
City, thereby circumventing the immunity enjoyed by the City
pursuant to Monroe.9 3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding."'
The Supreme Court reversed these decisions and in the process
overruled Monroe's conferral of immunity upon local governments.95 In overturning a portion of its own decision in Monroe,
the Monell majority stated that the Monroe Court misread the
Congressional intent behind the enactment of the Civil Right Act
of 1871.96 Monell held that Congress clearly intended for § 1 of the
Act-now § 1983-to apply to municipalities and that Congress
7
could constitutionally subject municipalities to liability.
Monell recognized that the rationale behind municipal immunity
was rooted in the notion that local governments are creations of
state law, and that it. would be beyond the power of the federal
government to impose a liability or obligation upon a state's creation.98 However, based upon statements made during Congressional debate over the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, the Mo91. 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (1975) (citing Cleveland Board of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974)).
92. 394 F. Supp. at 855.

93. Id.
94. 532 F.2d 259 (1976).
95. 436 U.S. at 663.
96. Id. at 700-01.
97. Id. The Monell Court arrived at its decision by using an additional layer of legislative interpretations not used by the Monroe Court. Both Courts' interpretations revolved
around congressional debate of the Sherman Amendment, which would have imposed liability on municipalities for damage caused to private property by riots which municipalities
did not attempt to control. Ultimately this Amendment was adopted by Congress in a version which made no mention of municipal liability. The Monroe Court used statements
against municipal liability pursuant to this Amendment as its basis for granting immunity
for municipalities. Id. at 668. On the other hand, the Monell Court found that § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act was already voted upon affirmatively when Congress took up debate on the
Sherman Amendment. Therefore, Monell held that Congressional statements relating to
doubts over the constitutionality of the imposition of municipal liability pertained only to
the Sherman Amendment and not to § 1 of the Act. The Monell Court reasoned that Congress was aware of these concerns when it voted on § 1 and their silence on those concerns
at that stage implied that Congress knew what it was doing. The inference drawn by Monell
was that the liability debated and voted against in the Sherman Amendment was different
than the liability contemplated in § 1 of the Act. Id. at 665-82.
98. Id. at 664.
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nell Court concluded that Congress was aware of two major points
which created jurisdiction over the states in federal courts. 99
First, it was acknowledged that Congress had power to grant federal jurisdiction over local governments that either used or refused
to use their authorized powers in violation of the Constitution.10 0
Second, the Monell Court stated that the doctrine of Dual Sovereignty did not limit the powers of federal courts to enforce the
Constitution against municipalities that violated it. 1 1
The first of these two points clarifies why a claim such as that of
the Littlefields, for the denial of a building permit, has found a
place in federal courts. As previously discussed, the Littlefields'
federally protected property right arises from the existence of state
law which limits the discretion of a municipal official to withhold a
permit. This law creates a ministerial duty in the official to issue
the permit. When the holder of a ministerial duty refuses to act as
duly authorized by state law in a way which infringes upon a constitutional right, it follows that the jurisdiction
of federal courts
102
maybe employed to protect that right.
The Monell Court further concluded that the legislative intent
called for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act to be a broad remedy
designed to secure and preserve human liberty and human rights
embodied by the fourteenth amendment.10 The Court then reasoned that since the intent was for § 1 to be construed broadly,
little reason existed to doubt that municipalities should be excluded from its broad sweep.0'4 One limitation which Monell
placed on its holding was that the action of the local official must
arise from some official policy or custom of the municipality. 0 5 A
municipality could not be held liable solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior.0 6
From the sweeping language of the initial holding of Monroe and
of the entire Monell holding, it follows that an increased number
of claims would be brought in federal courts against local governments and local officials pursuant to § 1983.107 The first cases re99.

Id. at 679-81.

100. Id. at 679-80.
101. Id. at 680-81.
102. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103. 436 U.S. at 683-86.
104. Id. at 686.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Id.
107. In addition, a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), restricted local government immunity even further. Owen stands
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lated to deprivation of land use or building permits initiated via §
1983 claims began to appear in the circuit courts in the early
1980's. One such early case, Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 0 8 was
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1980.
In Rogin, a dispute arose in which a real estate developer challenged a zoning amendment which restricted his ability to obtain
building permits for the continuation of a development previously
approved by the Township.109 The claim alleged substantive due
process violations and an unconstitutional taking."' During the
course of its discussion, the Third Circuit recognized that § 1983
was designed to afford the plaintiff a cause of action for constitutional violations on the part of local government bodies."'
While the Rogin Court recognized that a valid cause of action
had been stated, it nonetheless affirmed the district court's holding
for the Township. In so deciding, the Third Circuit announced that
for a plaintiff to be successful in a substantive due process claim, it
must establish that the actions of the local government were arbitrary and lacked a rational relation to the general welfare of the
community.1 12 In this particular case, the Court was satisfied that
the Township "had a legitimate interest in controlling population
growth and density and that zoning amendments are a rational
and reasonable means to accomplish that purpose."" 3
Subsequently, in 1983, four different circuit courts handed down
decisions in which they recognized that a cause of action could be
initiated under § 1983 for denial of land use or building permits. ""
The common thread running through these decisions was that in
order for the due process claim to be valid, a party needed to
demonstrate that the actions of a municipality were arbitrary, cafor the proposition that a municipality cannot assert a defense of good faith for its constitutional violations. Id. at 650. The Owen Court did state that municipalities enjoy a degree of
immunity where their functions are "discretionary" or "legislative" in nature. However, no
immunity is present where their functions are deemed "ministerial." Id. at 644.
108. 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
109. Id. at 682.
110. Id. at 683.
111. Id. at 686 (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
112. Id. at 689.
113. Id. The Rogin court rejected the developer's taking claim on the grounds that it
was insufficient for the developer to aver that his property value had been diminished by
the zoning amendment. The court stated that a rational zoning ordinance could diminish
property values and still be upheld as long as the ordinance applied to a broad class of
property owners and the ordinance did not destroy or severely diminish the value of the
property. Id. at 690 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125
(1978)).
114. See supra note 27.
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pricious and devoid of a rational relation to the general welfare of
the municipality. A primary step toward establishing a § 1983
claim is to show the existence of an entitlement to the permit in
order to raise it to the level of a federally protected property
right.'1 5
In relation to the aforementioned historical discussion, the decision by the Eight Circuit in Littlefield v. City of Afton serves as an
extension of a newly developing area of the law. 116 However, the
question underlying most, if not all, of these decisions by the circuit courts is whether disputes of this nature belong in federal
courts. By their very character they are disputes of a local nature.
On the other hand, however, the real estate development process
is very often a high-stakes venture in which large profits may be
realized. It is not unusual for there to be competing interests and
proposals for the same development parcel, leaving open possibilities for personality differences between a developer and a local official. This in turn creates situations where an official may withhold
a permit arbitrarily.
In this regard, the availability of a federal remedy offers a source
of protection in a neutral forum to a landowner who has a legitimate property right. The underlying message in these circuit court
decisions is that § 1983 provides a remedy which should be recognized as necessary to protect a property right egregiously denied
by the actions of a local official. It is also viewed as a remedy which
should be granted sparingly because of the delicate balance between the local character of these disputes and the need to protect
117
constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether § 1983 claims of
this type state a valid cause of action. On three separate occasions,
the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to decide this question,
most recently in Williamson County Regional Planning Commis115. At one time, claims brought under § 1983 could be instituted only in furtherance
of personal rights. However, the Supreme Court decision of Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972), expanded § 1983's purview to include property rights.
116. The court in Littlefield cited several cases decided on this topic by the First Circuit. See, e.g., Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1983); Cordeco Development
Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1978 (1976).
In these decisions, the First Circuit applies a stricter test to justify a § 1983 claim for permit
denial. The First Circuit requires a showing of willfulness or actual malice on the part of the
local official for this type of claim to be valid. 539 F.2d at 260.
117. See, e.g., Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing
Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1419 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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sion v. Hamilton Bank.118 The Court left open and unanswered the
issue of whether a municipality's actions were so violative of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as to amount to a
taking for which the landowner was entitled to damages.119 In each
of the cases the Supreme Court took a more traditional eminent
domain approach and decided pertinent issues on state procedural
grounds. While the highest court has not answered this new § 1983
issue directly, perhaps it is indirectly telling disgruntled landowners that they should look to state courts and state remedies before
jumping into the federal forum.
Chester J. Karas, Jr.

118. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). The other two cases in which the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to consider this issue were San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981) (appellant's taking claim dismissed because the Court held that the court of
appeals decision contemplated resolution of factual taking issues by the trial court); and
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance which limits development of openspace land does not take property since a legitimate public goal is fostered).
119. 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3116 (1985).

